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ENCLOSURE NO. 2

ADEQUACY OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

1. Reporting from the Field.

a. Cable Traffic.

During the month of January, approximately 88 per cent of the cables (including reports published by SO, but apparently based on cables received by them) received were from the Department of State. Approximately 10 per cent were from the Department of the Army and the remainder were from the Department of the Navy and the Office of Special Operations. Cables form the basis for most of the production of Current Intelligence, and CIA is therefore primarily dependent upon the Department of State for reporting on the current situation.

b. Field Reports.

Of the written reports upon which the production of CIA Staff Intelligence is largely based, the Department of State supplied the largest volume for the areas covered by the Northern, Near East/Africa, Western Europe, and Latin American Branches. The Department of the Army supplied the largest volume of material from the Far East area and the Office of Special Operations furnished the largest volume from the Eastern Europe/USSR area. The Army was the second largest contributor in all areas except the Far East where it was the largest contributor.

c. Appraisal.

(1) The information received by ORE from all areas during the month, except the Northern area, was not entirely adequate in quality and in breadth of coverage. Coverage in the Northern area, while variable in quality, was adequate in scope. Information from the Far Eastern, Northern, Western European, and Near East/African areas was adequate in quantity for the topics covered, but the information from the Eastern European/USSR and the Latin American areas was not received in the most desirable quantity in addition to being somewhat short of satisfactory quality and breadth of coverage.

(2) Scientific information received was generally inadequate in all categories. This appears to have been due in part to the lack of field personnel with technical competence to handle scientific intelligence.

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(3) While the supply of maps and map information is inadequate in the number of areas being covered, the situation may improve in that the Foreign Service map procurement officers now in the field were trained by, and receive their orders from the Map Branch, ORE. This arrangement with the Department of State permits the Map Branch more direct control over fulfillment of its requirements within the limits of the present number of map procurement officers on duty.

(4) The reports submitted by the Office of Operations were evaluated as 4 per cent of considerable value, 60 per cent of value, 26 per cent of slight value, 2 per cent of no value, 6 per cent already sufficiently known, and 2 per cent for which there were no data permitting assessment.

The reports submitted by the Office of Special Operations were evaluated as 7 per cent of considerable value, 62 per cent of value, 22 per cent of slight value, 2 per cent of no value, 1 per cent already sufficiently known, and 6 per cent for which there were no data permitting assessment.

## 2. Intelligence Coverage by CIA.

While the intelligence produced by ORE on specific situations was qualitatively acceptable, it was necessary to meet the most pressing needs for intelligence on a priority basis without complete coverage of all situations.

## 3. Intelligence Coverage by the Other IAC Agencies.

a. In general, adequacy of the intelligence produced by the other IAC agencies appears to have varied in direct proportion to the adequacy of reporting on the area concerned.

b. Intelligence coverage of the USSR and its satellites, for example, by the other IAC agencies was not adequate in either quantity or quality. This inadequacy, as well as the inadequacies in ORE coverage on the same area, appears to have been due in part to:

- (1) Soviet security measures which limit reporting from the area;
- (2) Shortage of qualified experts; and
- (3) A possible over-dispersion of such experts as exist.

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